The control of pandemic pathogens depends on early prediction of pandemic variants and, more generally, 40 understanding origins of such variants and factors that drive their global spread. This is especially 41 important for GII.4 norovirus, where vaccines under development offer promise to prevent hundreds of 42 millions of annual gastroenteritis cases. Previous studies have suggested that new GII.4 pandemic viruses 43 evolve from previous pandemic variants through substitutions in the antigenic region of the VP1 protein 44 that enable evasion of host population immunity, leading to global spread. In contrast, we show here that 45 the acquisition of new genetic and antigenic characteristics is not the proximal driver of new pandemics. 46 Instead, pandemic GII.4 viruses circulate undetected for years before causing a new pandemic, during 47 which time they diversify and spread over wide geographical areas. Serological data demonstrate that by 48 2003, some nine years before it emerged as a new pandemic, the ancestral 2012 pandemic strain had 49 already acquired the antigenic characteristics that allowed it to evade prevailing population immunity 50 against the previous 2009 pandemic variant. These results provide strong evidence that viral genetic 51 changes are necessary but not sufficient for GII.4 pandemic spread. Instead, we suggest that it is changes 52 in host population immunity that enable pandemic spread of an antigenically-preadapted GII.4 variant. 53 These results indicate that predicting future GII.4 pandemic variants will require surveillance of currently 54 unsampled reservoir populations. Furthermore, a broadly acting GII.4 vaccine will be critical to prevent 55 future pandemics. 56 57 Significance 58 Norovirus pandemics and their associated public health and economic costs could be prevented by 59 effective vaccines. However, vaccine development and distribution will require identification of the 60 sources and drivers of new pandemics. We here use phylogenetics and serological experiments to develop 61 and test a new hypothesis of pandemic norovirus emergence. We find that pandemic noroviruses pre-62 adapt, diversify and spread worldwide years prior to emergence, strongly indicating that genetic changes 63 are necessary but not sufficient to drive a new pandemic. We instead suggest that changes in population 64 immunity enable pandemic emergence of a pre-adapted low-level variant. These findings indicate that 65 prediction of new pandemics will require surveillance of under-sampled virus reservoirs and that 66 norovirus vaccines will need to elicit broad immunity. 67 68 Parra et al. 2017), as well as other geographically-limited outbreaks caused by epidemic variants 78 (Siebenga et al. 2009; Eden et al. 2014). 79 80 Vaccines currently under development offer promise to mitigate the global economic and health impact 81 of new GII.4 pandemics (Lindesmith et al. 2015). However, effective vaccine design and distribution 82 depend on understanding the sources from which new pandemic variants emerge and the factors that drive 83 their global circulation especially if, like influenza, vaccine updates are necessary. It has been proposed 84 that new pandemic GII.4 viruses generally evolve from one of the preceding pandemic variants (Siebenga 85 et al. 2007; White 2014) through acquisition of substitutions in the capsid VP1 protein that alter 86 3
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Noroviruses are the leading cause of acute gastroenteritis in humans worldwide, causing an estimated 684 70 million gastroenteritis episodes, 200,000 deaths and $65 billion of health and societal costs annually (Kirk 71 et al. 2015; Pires et al. 2015; Bartsch et al. 2016) . While more than 30 norovirus genotypes have been 72 described based on sequence variation in the VP1 capsid protein, the GII.4 genotype is responsible for the 73 majority of human cases and outbreaks and has caused six major pandemics since the mid-1990s, each 77 We next used datasets of VP1 sequences to reconstruct a more detailed temporal history of the two most 135 recent pandemic variants, New Orleans 2009 and Sydney 2012 (Figures 2, S3 ). Similar to other pandemic 136 GII.4 variants (Siebenga et al. 2010) , New Orleans 2009 and Sydney 2012 VP1 regions underwent a large 137 increase in relative genetic diversity coinciding with their pandemic emergence in 2009 and 2012, 138 respectively ( Figure S3 ). However, each variant had already diversified into many lineages prior to 139 pandemic emergence, at least 67 (95% HPD 41-100) and 88 (95% HPD 59-113) lineages for New Orleans 140 2009 and Sydney 2012, respectively (Figures 2A-B, S3 ). Each of the other pandemic GII.4 variants also 141 exhibit this pre-pandemic divergence (Figure 1) . Therefore, pandemic variants not only arise long before 142 the pandemic is observed, but also undergo extensive diversification into multiple related lineages that 143 circulate at low levels for years preceding pandemic emergence. 144 145 To determine the extent of circulation prior to pandemic emergence, we reconstructed the spatiotemporal 146 history of New Orleans 2009 and Sydney 2012, which demonstrated entry into each continent prior to 147 pandemic emergence ( Figure 2 ). Specifically, New Orleans 2009 likely entered Africa, Asia and Oceania 148 more than two years prior to pandemic emergence while Sydney 2012 was likely introduced into Africa, 149 Europe and Oceania more than four years before pandemic emergence ( Figure 2C-D) . Following their 150 introduction, these data suggest sustained intra-and inter-continental circulation of New Orleans 2009 151 and Sydney 2012 both before (at lower levels) and after (at higher levels) pandemic emergence ( Figure   152 2E-F). 153 154 The pandemic variant common ancestor date occurring years prior to pandemic emergence indicates either 155 that the important characteristics for pandemic spread were acquired years before such spread occurred 156 or that such changes were acquired convergently following diversification into multiple lineages. The Together, our results indicate that pandemic GII.4 variants arise, diversify and spread widely years before 210 they emerge to cause a pandemic. If a new pandemic was triggered by antigenic change or another viral 211 characteristic, a single lineage would rapidly increase in prevalence, as is observed for influenza A H3N2 212 (Bedford et al. 2015) . Our data instead strongly support a scenario where the key antigenic and other 213 changes are acquired through substitutions and/or recombination events years before pandemic 214 emergence. Therefore the pandemic event is not proximally driven by genetic changes in any of the 215 genomic regions altering antigenicity, receptor binding or another property. 216 217 These results raise the question of what drives a variant that has been circulating widely and cryptically 218 for years to suddenly increase in frequency, dominate outbreaks worldwide and rapidly replace the 219 preceding pandemic variant. It is unlikely that stochastic factors would enable widely spread lineages 220 from a single variant within an individual genotype to emerge simultaneously. We therefore suggest that 221 norovirus pandemics are driven by a change in host factors. Given the importance of herd immunity in 222 variant emergence (Lindesmith et al. 2012; Debbink et al. 2013; Lindesmith et al. 2013) , we hypothesize 223 that a shift in host population immunity (potentially driven by growing immunity against the previous 224 pandemic variant) opens a population-wide immunological niche into which the multiple circulating, but 225 hidden, lineages of the new pandemic variant can expand, having acquired the necessary antigenic 226 characteristics to do so years before. Therefore viral genetic changes are necessary but not sufficient for 227 pandemic emergence. Instead, a shift in host immunity combines with antigenic preadaptation to drive a 228 new pandemic. Vaccination against norovirus has previously been demonstrated to alter the serological 229 blockade repertoire (Lindesmith et al. 2015) , supporting the notion that infection of a large number of 230 individuals can alter population-level immunity. Alternatively, variant emergence could be delayed by 231 widespread heterotypic immunity that decays faster than homotypic immunity raised against the preceding 232 pandemic variant. A natural corollary is that future pandemic GII.4 variants are continuing to circulate 233 and diversify undetected within the reservoir until such time as changes in host immunity should favor 234 the emergence of a new pandemic variant. These results also raise the question of where pre-pandemic variants circulate over the years prior to 237 emergence. Both immunocompromised patients and animals have been mooted as a potential source of 238 pandemic GII.4 variants (Kari Debbink et al. 2014; Karst and Baric 2015) . While it is possible that either 239 of these hosts could be the source of the ancestral variant, both seem unlikely to be the source of the 240 diversifying pre-pandemic lineage. It is unlikely that multiple pandemic lineages could emerge 241 simultaneously from a single immunocompromised host at pandemic onset. It is also difficult to explain 242 how multiple immunocompromised patients could form the inter-connected intercontinental transmission 243 network required for this pre-diversification, supporting recent suggestions that immunocompromised 244 patients are an unlikely reservoir (Eden et al. 2017) . Additionally, while GII.4 viruses have occasionally 245 been detected in stool samples from cows, pigs and dogs (Mattison et al. 2007; Summa et al. 2012) , 246 concurrent emergence of multiple lineages would require multiple zoonotic transmissions and no such 247 transmissions have been observed (Wilhelm et al. 2015) . A more parsimonious explanation for our 248 findings is that pandemic GII.4 variants circulate within the community and are not detected by current 249 surveillance efforts that largely target outbreaks, predominantly in hospital and institutional settings (Inns 250 et al. 2017). More extensive co-circulation of viral lineages has been noted in influenza A H1N1 and 251 influenza B compared with influenza A H3N2 and has been correlated with slower rates of antigenic drift 252 and a lower average age of infection (Bedford et al. 2015; Vijaykrishna et al. 2015) . While noroviruses 253 are prevalent in individuals of all age groups, the infection rate is highest in young children (Lopman et 254 al. 2016; O'Brien et al. 2016) . In this regard, of the 16 identified pre-pandemic samples for which this 255 information is available, 15 are either from children or were sampled in a nursery or primary school 256 ( Figure S2 , Table S3 ). The ability of the ancestral Sydney 2012 VLPs to evade anti-New Orleans 2009 257 polyclonal sera raised in mice that have not previously been exposed to norovirus ( Figure 3C ) suggests 258 that these viruses would have been able to evade immunity raised in young children. Due to the presence of recombination close to ORF boundaries, we ran all analyses on the RdRp, VP1 285 and VP2 separately. Each genome region was aligned at the amino acid level using MUSCLE (Edgar 286 2004). We screened for the presence of intra-genic recombination in the RdRp, VP1 and VP2 separately 287 using the Single Breakpoint (SBP) method implemented in HyPhy (Pond et al. 2006) , identifying 19 288 sequences as potential recombinants in VP1 (Table S8 ). These sequences clustered differently with strong 289 support on either side of the putative breakpoint in phylogenetic trees reconstructed with RAxML v8.1 290 (Stamatakis 2014) with the GTR model and gamma rate heterogeneity with four gamma classes. SBP was 291 then run on the alignment again following removal of these samples to ensure the recombination signal 292 had been removed. A summary of the number of remaining sequences from each GII.4 variant and each 293 RdRp genotype is shown in Table S9 . The variant names used here are those returned by the norovirus 294 genotyping tool (Kroneman et al. 2011). 295 296 Methods employing sequence data and sampling dates to infer divergence times are valid only if there is 297 a temporal evolutionary signal in the dataset (Rambaut et al. 2016) . To assess whether each of our datasets 298 exhibits a temporal evolutionary signal, we reconstructed a maximum likelihood tree using RAxML, as 299 above. We identified the best-fitting root position using TempEst v1.5 (Rambaut et al. 2016 ) and 300 calculated the R2 correlation between root-to-tip distance and sampling date ( Figure S7 ). There was a 301 significant temporal evolutionary signal within each dataset (p < 0.001).
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We reconstructed the temporal evolutionary history of each genomic region using the Bayesian Markov (Table S9) , we took three random 307 subsamples of 41 sequences from each of these variants (with 41 chosen to match the number of sequences 308 in the third most numerous variant); results were insensitive to the subsampled dataset (Table S10) rate for VP2 across the GII.4 clade. We therefore employed the same prior as for the VP1 dataset. We 319 applied a coalescent Bayesian skyline tree prior. Three replicate runs with different starting values were 320 performed for each dataset and clock model and run until convergence, as assessed using Tracer v1.6 321 (Rambaut et al. 2014 We estimated variant divergence dates and recombination dates by combining the posterior distribution 328 of trees from each subsampled dataset into a single posterior distribution. We inferred variant divergence 329 dates by calculating the date of the most recent common ancestor between each pair of variants in each 330 tree in this posterior distribution. To calculate the date of each recombination event, we identified the 331 mean and 95% HPD of the distribution of branch start and end times of the corresponding branch in each 332 tree in the posterior distribution.
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Identification of pre-pandemic and pre-epidemic GII.4 sequences 335 336 We defined pre-pandemic/pre-epidemic sequences as those that cluster with a GII.4 variant but were 337 collected prior to the year in which that variant emerged pandemically or epidemically. We genotyped all 338 GII.4 VP1 sequences present on GenBank containing more than 400 nucleotides (Kroneman et al. 2011) . 339 We identified 50 sequences with a reported collection date earlier than the year of pandemic/epidemic 340 emergence of the respective variant. We estimated the collection date of each of these sequences using 341 BEAST v2.4.2 (Bouckaert et al. 2014) , assuming a uniform prior distribution with minimum 1974.5 and 342 maximum 2015.446575 (the dates of the earliest and latest collected sequences in the main dataset). The 343 95% HPD of the estimated collection date overlapping with the reported collection date was taken as 344 evidence to support, but not confirm, the reported collection date. We collected datasets containing all available VP1 sequences on GenBank as of 09/02/2017 from New 366 Orleans 2009 (n=565) and Sydney 2012 (n=708). Each dataset exhibited temporal signal as above. 367 Examination of the sampling locations showed that there was typically only a small number of sequences 368 from each country (Table S11 ). We therefore used the continent of collection as the location label. The (Table S11 ). Should sequences from the same continent cluster together within the 372 tree, an excess of sequences from one continent is unlikely to alter estimates of ancestral locations. 373 However, if sequences from the different continents are typically interspersed within the tree, an excess 374 of sequences from one continent could result in artifactual support for this continent being the location of 375 ancestral nodes. The sequences from each continent are interspersed throughout the tree in both New 376 Orleans 2009 and Sydney 2012 ( Figure S8 ). We therefore randomly down-sampled New Orleans 2009 377 sequences from Asia and Oceania and Sydney 2012 sequences from Asia to match the number of 378 sequences from the next most commonly represented continent. We carried out three random subsamples 379 and performed all analyses on each subsampled dataset. All results were insensitive to the subsampled 380 dataset. were labelled with the most accurate collection date possible. We modelled the nucleotide substitution 385 process using the HKY substitution model and gamma rate heterogeneity with four gamma classes. We 386 applied both the strict and relaxed lognormal clock models. In each case there was strong support to reject 387 the strict clock model in favor of the relaxed lognormal clock model (log10 Bayes factor 66-83) and we 388 9 therefore used the relaxed lognormal clock model for our inferences. However, the results with the strict 389 clock model are qualitatively very similar, indicating that potential over-parameterization due to the large 390 number of branch-specific rates with the relaxed lognormal clock model has not influenced our results. 391 We applied a lognormal prior on the substitution rate with mean 7x10 -3 for New Orleans 2009 and 6.4x10 -392 3 for Sydney 2012 and standard deviation 0.1 in each case, based on the posterior estimates of the variant 393 substitution rates inferred previously. We employed a Bayesian coalescent skyline tree prior for each 394 dataset. We applied a discrete phylogeographic model to describe lineage migrations within each dataset 395 (24), consisting of a symmetric transition matrix for the migration rates and a set of Bayesian stochastic 396 search variable selection (BSSVS) indicator variables. We assumed a Poisson prior for the number of 'on' 397 BSSVS variables with mean 5 for the New Orleans 2009 datasets and mean 4 for the Sydney 2012 398 datasets. We used an exponential prior with mean 1.0 migration rate per lineage per year for the overall 399 rate of geographical transition and a gamma prior with shape 1.0 and scale 1.0 for each of the relative 400 geographical transition rates. Three replicate runs with different starting parameters were carried out with 401 each dataset and run until convergence, as assessed using Tracer v1.6 (Rambaut et al. 2014). Runs from 402 each subsampled dataset were combined into a single posterior distribution for downstream analyses. 403 404 We identified the date of first import into each continent by calculating either the root date if the continent 405 was inferred to be the root location or the earliest branch midpoint where the downstream node was 406 inferred to be within the continent. We calculated this date within each tree in the posterior distribution. 407 We therefore assume that migration events occurred at the midpoint of the branch. We obtain similar 408 results using the earliest non-root node inferred to be within the continent, which assumes that migration 409 occurs at the end of the branch. We used the program posterior analysis of coalescent trees (PACT) v0.9.4 410 to compute the proportion of lineages present on each continent through time. We collected a dataset containing all 2198 available GII.4 VP1 sequences, including sequences from all 416 of the major GII.4 variants (Table S12 ). Alignment and phylogenetic reconstruction was carried out as 417 above. We used RAxML to optimize branch lengths within the maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree 418 and ten bootstrap tree topologies using the amino acid alignment and the WAG substitution model with 419 optimized base frequencies. We used multiple tree topologies to assess the influence of tree topology on 420 our inferences. We carried out ancestral reconstruction at the amino acid level with PAML v4.9 (Yang To identify substitutions with the nonstructural polyprotein and VP2 we collected datasets containing all 427 available GII and GIV nonstructural polyprotein sequences (Table S13 ) and all available GII.4 VP2 428 sequences (Table S12) , respectively. We identified substitutions leading to each GII.4 variant using the 429 same process described for VP1 above. 
